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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the extent to which the
Contractor Risk Assessment Guide (CRAG) Program at General
Dynamics in San Diego, California, is achieving the goal of
improved Department of Defense oversight processes and more
effective contractor internal control systems. The study
describes the development, reviews the basic audit procedures,
and examines the five chapters of the CRAG Program. The
research demonstrates that reduced duplication of effort was
attained at General Dynamics' San Diego divisions through
coordinated statistical sampling and audit planning. The
environment created by the CRAG Program has resulted in an
improved relationship between General Dynamics and government
oversight personnel. The study concludes that the CRAG
Program is an effective method to promote self-governance in
the defense industry and recommends continued support from
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In June 1986, the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management (Packard Commission) published its final
report. One of its conclusions was that contract violations
would be reduced if government contractors established more
effective internal controls [Ref. l:p. 80]. To improve
corporate controls, the Commission recommended:
.promulgation and enforcement of more effective
internal control systems .... establishment of a more
effective oversight of the entire process by an
independent committee... [Ref. l:p. 81]
In response to the Packard Commission Report, the
Contractor Risk Assessment Guide (CRAG)' Program was
implemented in November 1988 through a joint effort of the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), Department of Defense
Inspector General (DODIG), Department of Defense (DOD)
acquisition community, and the defense industry, as
represented by the Council of Defense and Space Industry
Associations (CODSIA). [Ref. 2:p. i]
The CRAG Program focuses on high-risk areas which account
for the majority of problems in government contracting. At
the time of this thesis, five high-risk areas have been
developed into chapters for the CRAG: [Ref. 2 :p. 1]
'Abbreviations and acronyms frequently used throughout
this thesis may be found in Appendix A.
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- Labor Charging,
- Materials Management and Accounting Systems,
- Indirect Cost Submissions,
- Estimating Systems, and
- Purchasing.
The program is voluntary. First, the contractor must
decide if and to what extent he will participate. Then the
contractor, Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO), and the
appropriate DOD oversight activity will work together to
ascertain the reliability of the contractor's system of
internal controls. The contractor must be able to describe
and document the policies, controls, training program, and
test and monitoring procedures which define the system for the
applicable CRAG risk areas. Finally, if the government finds
the contractor's internal controls to be acceptable, it may
rely on contractor audit results to: [Ref. 3:p. 15]
- reduce oversight,
- shift manpower to areas such as contract close-out which
may benefit the contractor, or
- shift oversight resources to known problem areas.
The expense of implementing the CRAG Program may vary
significantly depending on the quality of a contractor's
internal control systems. Contractors with strong internal
control systems may require little more than a demonstration
of their systems and coordination with government
representatives.
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Potential financial benefits to the contractor may also
vary significantly. When government oversight is reduced,
those contractor employees who were required to prepare
information, coordinate, and monitor government auditors are
released to perform productive activities. In addition,
government auditors may use audit hours saved by CRAG
participation to expedite audits which accelerate contract
close-out. Large businesses may receive progress payments not
exceeding 80 percent of the total costs incurred. As a
result, final close-out payments may be significant. General
Dynamics' southern California divisions recorded costs of over
$640 million in 1989 [Ref. 4:p. 1]. At ten percent simple
interest, a one year delay in contract close-out could cost
the corporation almost $13 million.
A contractor is not assured of reduced oversight by
participation in the CRAG Program. Reduced oversight and
other potential benefits depend upon the degree to which the
government is able to rely on a contractor's internal control
system. Without a guarantee, many contractors are hesitant to
participate. During the early development of CRAG, the
following concerns were frequently articulated to government
representatives: [Ref. 5:p. 2]
- little industry confidence DOD will actually reduce
oversight,
- lack of trust between contractors and DOD,
- potential or perceived benefits don't justify the cost
to implement,
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differences between the DOD understanding and
commitment at Headquarters' locations versus contractor
site locations, and
perceived coordination difficulties among the
government team.
On 8 August 1990, the Director, DCAA described the
progress made by the CRAG Program. Speaking at a seminar
given to the Association of Internal Auditors, he estimated
that CRAG participation by a sample of five defense contractor
divisions would result in fiscal year 1991 DCAA staff
reductions of almost 18,000 auditing hours representing about
12 staff man years [Ref. 5:p. 5]. In addition to zeduced
oversight, the DOD CRAG Program Steering Group described the
value of the program as follows: [Ref 2:p. i]
The value of the CRAG Program to both government and
industry is that it is a long-term program with a goal of
improving the DOD oversight and procurement processes and
enhancing the image of government contracting in the eyes
of the Congress and the public.
Despite the apparent success stories, some contractors
still believe the CRAG Program will lead to increased
government oversight and escalating costs to defense
contractors. For those contractors, more evidence is needed.
This thesis will examine the evidence available and
hypothesize the net worth of the CRAG Program.
B. OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH
The objectives of this study are to: (1) ascertain what
impact the CRAG Program has had on contractor internal control
systems and related government oversight of those systemr, (2)
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determine if the benefits justify the cost of implementation
both to the government and participating ccnuractors, and (3)
identify those aspects of CRAG implementation which may be
analogous among all participants.
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
This thesis is limited to a case analysis of CRAG
implementation at the San Diego, California, divisions of a
major defense contractor. The study employs commi -its and
opinions of key government ani defense industry officials to
make inferences regarding the overall effectiveness of the
CRAG Program.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To achieve the stated objective, the following primary
research question is presented: To what extent is the CRAG
Program achieving the goal of improved DOD oversight processes
and more effective contractor internal control systems?
In support of the primary -uestion, the following
subsidiary questions were established:
- What are the essential features of the CRAG Program as it
currently exists and how has the program been
implemented?
- To what extent has the CRAG Program changed the internal
control systems of General Dynamics' San Diego divisions?
- To what extent has the CRAG Program changed Department of
Defense oversight for General Dynamics' San Diego
divisions?
- What benefits and costs have resulted from the CRAG
Program at General Dynamics' San Diego divisions?
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- Which elements of the CRAG Program at participating
General Dynamics divisions are common to all CRAG
participants?
- What inferences may be made from the experience of
General Dynamics' San Diego divisions which could be used
by other contractors wishing to implement the CRAG
Program?
- What level of support has been demonstrated for the CRAG
Program by government and industry?
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The primary source of information presented in this study
was obtained from on-site visits and interviews with
representatives of General Dynamics' San Diego divisions, the
cognizant Defense Plant Representative Office (DPRO), and the
on-site DCAA representative.
Supporting information was obtained from telephone
interviews and correspondence with representatives of the
Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC), DCAA, DODIG, Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USDA), CODSIA,
Electronic Industries Association (EIA), and the Aerospace
Industries Association (AIA). Current articles in
professional journals and publications were reviewed as
another source of research data in addition to speeches
delivered to the July 1990 National Contract Management
Association (NCMA) National Education Conference, and the
August 1990 Institute of Internal Auditors CRAG Implementation
Update Conference.
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study consists of six chapters. Chapter I contains
the introduction and research questions in addition to
providing comment on the scope, purpose, and research
methodology of the study. Chapter II provides background
information for the entire CRAG Program and specific
background for the contractor being studied. Chapter III
describes the essential features of the CRAG Program and
internal audit standards.
Chapters IV and V contain the primary research results.
Chapter IV identifies some of the effects of CRAG Program
implementation experienced by General Dynamics' San Diego
divisions and the government. Chapter V analyzes potential
costs, benefits, and threats related to implementation of the
program.
Chapter VI provides conclusions derived from the research
and recommendations for future study of the CRAG Program.
Appendices and a List of References are provided for
information and to facilitate further research in this area.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. CRAG PROGRAM HISTORY
In 1985, the defense industry was plagued by scandals and
allegations of fraud and mismanagement. President Reagan
established a blue ribbon commission headed by David Packard
(Packard Commission) to study, report findings and make
recommendations concerning the issues surrounding defense
management and organization. The Commission identified four
separate areas of study: [Ref. l:p. xvii] National Security
Planning and Budgeting, Military Organization and Command,
Acquisition Organization and Procedures, and Government-
Industry Accountability. Increased contractor self-
governance, which would later be advanced through the CRAG
Program, was a primary recommendation of the government-
industry accountability study.
The Commission believes that self-governance is the
most promising mechanism to foster improved contract
compliance. It follows that each contractor must
individually initiate, develop, implement, and enforce
those elements of corporate governance that are critical
to contract compliance... [Ref. l:p. 84]
In February 1986, the certified public accounting firm of
Arthur Anderson & Company completed a study of DOD contract
auditing and oversight. They identified three principal
problems which emphasized the need for initiatives such as the
CRAG Program:
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- there is no coordination between DOD organizations with
different audit responsibilities,
- when planning audits, DOD organizations fail to take into
consideration contractor's past performance, results of
past or ongoing reviews, or the relative costs or
benefits of the audit, and
- the ACO, who is responsible for overall coordination of
contract administration, no longer functions as the
government's "team leader" and has very limited authority
to resolve audit recommendations. [Ref. 6:p. 3]
Historically, DOD auditors were assigned responsibility
for ensuring contractor compliance with DOD requirements [Ref.
l:p. 80]. In October 1987, the Department of Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) was changed to hold
contractors responsible for their own business practices and
to encourage self-governance programs [Ref. 7:p. 3.70].
Partially in response to preceding events, the CRAG
Program was initiated by the DODIG's office in early 1988. On
14 March 1988, the program was announced in the Federal
Contracts Report, and on 24 March 1988 CODSIA completed a
review of the CRAG first draft.
The Secretary of Defense sent letters to over 100 major
defense contractors on 9 May 1988 announcing the CRAG program
and encouraging support. A series of individual and joint
Department of Defense and industry working group meetings
culminated in a joint Department of Defense/industry forum on
23 September. The CRAG, as agreed upon by government and
industry, was published in October and officially approved by
the Secretary of Defense on 30 November 1988.
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In a memorandum to heads of contract administration for
each of the services, dated 7 February 1989, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Procurement [Ref. 8]
emphasized the key role of the ACO in keeping records and
coordinating CRAG Program participation.
Secretary of Defense Cheney's Defense ManaQement Report to
the President of 12 July 1989 encouraged increased industry
participation in the CRAG Program [Ref. 9:p. 23]. On 26 July,
in a letter to CODSIA, the Director of DCAA [Ref. 10]
expressed disappointment with the defense industry's support
of the CRAG Program and urged CODSIA to take a leadership role
in encouraging its members to participate.
The DCAA [Ref ll:p. 45] informed defense contractors in
January 1990 that it would reassign audit hours saved by CRAG
Program participation to catch up on the backlog of overhead
audits. This provided a cash incentive to contractors since
they usually receive final settlement when the contract is
closed, but a contract cannot be closed until the overhead
audits are completed. In March the Commander of the new DCMC
[Ref. 12] requested his regional commanders actively solicit
contractor participation in the CRAG Program, and between
January and May [Ref. 13:p. 701] the number of participants in
the CRAG Program increased from 6 to 13 companies.
A CRAG Implementation Update workshop was sponsored by the
Institute of Internal Auditors on 8 August 1990. The workshop
featured five top defense contractors who are implementing the
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CRAG Program in varying degrees. Government agencies were
equally represented. The workshop provided a forum at which
contractors and government auditors described their
experiences with CRAG Program implementation. The opportunity
was also used to encourage greater industry participation.
Government agencies and defense industry leaders presented a
unified front in their total support of the CRAG Program.
In a letter dated 13 August 1990, [Ref. 14] DCAA's
Assistant Director of Policy and Plans reported that 18 major
DOD contractors were implementing a portion of the CRAG
Program at 42 locations or divisions. Evidence continues to
indicate that more contractors will implement the CRAG Program
in the future. For example, in a telephone conversation on 17
September 1990, [Ref. 15] DCAA's Western Deputy Regional
Director reported a large increase in interest by defense
contractors in CRAG Program participation.
B. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATE INFORMATION
General Dynamics is primarily an aerospace manufacturer
which designs, engineers, and manufactures military aircraft,
missiles, gun systems, space systems and related subassemblies
and components. It also designs and produces a variety of
defense electronic systems and products. [Ref. 16:p. 2992]
Other principal business operations include design,
engineering, construction and overhaul of submarines; design,
engineering, and manufacturing of tanks, land vehicles and
other support systems; design, engineering, manufacturing,
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and financing of general aviation aircraft; production of
commercial space launch vehicles; quarrying of limestone;
production of building products; and the mining of coal.
[Ref. 16:p. 2992]
On 31 December 1989, General Dynamics employed 102,200
people, posted net sales in excess of $10 billion and had
divisions and subsidiaries located in: [Ref. 16:p. 2992]
- San Diego, CA (3),
- Fort Worth, TX,
- Pomona, CA,
- Groton, CT,
- Chicago, IL (2),
- St. Louis, MO (2),
- Sterling Heights, MI,
- Rancho Cucamonga, CA,
- Wichita, KS,
- Quincy, MA, and
- Marion, IL.
In 1989, General Dynamics' Convair division alone posted
sales of over $800 million, 80 percent of which were to the
U.S. government. (Ref. 4:p. 1]
C. GENERAL DYNAMICS SELF-GOVERNANCE HISTORY
1. Corporate
The General Dynamics Corporation had been fined,
suspended, faced accusations of procurement fraud and had
government contracts withheld during the period from 1984 to
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1986. In response, the company established an industry
leading ethics program, an exhaustive review of outstanding
overhead claims, special reviews of vulnerable cost areas and
a zero administrative defects goal. General Dynamics was a
Defense Industry Initiatives (DII) signatory and supported and
helped develop the CRAG Program from its inception.
2. General Dynamics in San Diego
San Diego divisions also experienced charges of
improper procurement practices in 1984. Convair Division, for
example, was charged with failure to maintain accurate time
card records and to ensure allocation of labor costs to the
proper cost objectives. Many of the discrepancies could have
been avoided by an effective internal control system and open
communication with the government. Since 1986, General
Dynamics' major San Diego divisions have increased their use
of self-governance through self-reviews and employee training
programs.
In addition to corporate internal audit reviews,
divisional self-governance activities in CRAG areas include
the following:
- Overhead--Prior years' Accounting Data Reviews led to an
annual overhead statistical sampling of current year's
overhead claim and establishment of a Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) compliance board,
- Labor--Improved floorcheck programs,
- Material--Established a Material Management and
Accounting Systems (MMAS) Review which included quarterly
status to the government in cycle inventories, inventory
accuracy self-audits and Bill of Materials (BOM) accuracy
reviews,
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- Estimating--Implemented spares estimates screening and
individual price proposal reviews, and
- Purchasing--Conducted audits of subcontractors including
termination claims and close-outs.
Division employee training programs cover labor charging,
ethics, new business funds and overhead awareness. Division
auditors receive self-governance training in field work,
working paper standards, sampling techniques, report writing,
and supervision.
D. GENERAL DYNAMICS AUDIT RELATIONS HISTORY
Prior to the CRAG Program, government access to accounting
systems was restricted to areas covered under government-
installed retrieval programs. Under the CRAG Program, the
government also has access to General Dynamic's retrieval
programs. [Ref 4:p. 2]
Before CRAG Program implementation, General Dynamics
severely limited DCAA's access to records. Unless
specifically requested, even common internal communications
such as employee newsletters were not provided to the auditor.
The CRAG Program has created an environment where DCAA enjoys
expanded access to contractor reports, memorandums,
newsletters and other routine documents. The DCAA reports the
expanded access allows the audit staff to plan more
effectively. Audit efforts may be decreased where General
Dynamics' audits have already covered the risk. [Ref. 4:p. 2]
Floorcheck information was treated as proprietary by both
government auditors and General Dynamics personnel before CRAG
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Program implementation. Due to this limited interreliance,
there was significant duplication of effort. The government
auditors and General Dynamics now share observers, error
rates, reports, trends and leads. [Ref. 4:p. 2]
The DCAA employs over 6,000 auditors. In 1990, 26 of
those auditors were assigned full time to General Dynamics'
San Diego divisions. General Dynamics employs between 1,500
to 1,600 on-site auditors. Eight are assigned to San Diego.
Before the CRAG Program and other self-governance initiatives
were implemented, communication between General Dynamics and
the government audit staff was very limited. Most of the
interaction took place in written form. Now, General Dynamics
personnel and the government audit staff hold routine meetings
and regularly scheduled quarterly discussion meetings.
General Dynamics personnel also attend DCAA regional meetings.
[Ref. 4:p. 2]
E. GENERAL DYNAMICS VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS
To determine the risk vulnerability of a particular
division, General Dynamics Corporation considers:
- DCAA and corporate internal audit vulnerability
assessment procedures (VAPS),
- findings and frequency of prior audits, and
- management trend assessments.
Prior to 1986, government auditors estimated that General
Dynamics' San Diego divisions were highly vulnerable to fraud
or abuse in indirect costs, labor charging, estimating
15
systems, and material management and accounting systems
(MMAS). Their assessment was based on discrepancies
identified in audits and a lack of effective internal control
systems at those divisions reviewed. Since 1986, General
Dynamics and government personnel have worked closely to come
to a mutual assessment and improve the divisions' internal
control systems. The DCAA's vulnerability assessments for the
five CRAG areas since 1986 are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I
GENERAL DYNAMICS RISK ASSESSMENT BY CRAG AREA SINCE 1986
Indirect Costs .................... Low Risk,
Labor Charging ................... Average Risk,
MMAS ............................. Low Risk,
Estimating Systems ............... Average Risk,
Purchasing System ................ Low Risk.
Source: Defense Contract Audit Agency, General Dynamics,
San Diego, CRAG Implementation Notes, 26 March
1990
By 1989, General Dynamics' San Diego divisions' internal
control systems were in good condition and provided an
excellent opportunity to implement the CRAG Program.
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III. CRAG PROGRAM ESSENTIAL FEATURES AND AUDIT STANDARDS
A. CRAG PROGRAM PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION
1. Past Government Organization Problems
The Packard Commission recognized the need for
improved coordination between DOD agencies and Congress when
performing oversight of defense contractors. It noted that no
senior official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) was working full time to provide overall supervision of
the acquisition system. To rectify the problem, the
Commission recommended creation of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition (USDA) who would establish contract
policy throughout the DOD. The USDA would provide overall
coordination to promote efficiency and minimize duplication of
effort. [Ref. l:p. 90-91]
Despite progress, many top level industry executives
still list duplicative audits as a major business concern when
dealing with the government. [Ref. 17]
The entire scope of the oversight and audit effort for
defense contracts is excessive and needs review and
simplification. [Ref. 18:p. 40]
2. Current Government Organization
As the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), the USDA
advises the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) on all matters
relating to the acquisition system. His primary
responsibilities include: [Ref. 19 :p. E-2]
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- establishing uniform policies and practices governing
acquisition programs in general, and specific procedures,
documentation requirements, and responsibilities for
managing and reviewing major defense acquisition
programs,
- assuring that the concepts, policies, and provisions of
DOD Directive 5000.1 and OMB Circular A-109, "Major
Systems Acquisition," are complied with and effectively
administered throughout the DOD, and
- serving as Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board
(DAB).
The Inspector General for the DOD was established in
1982 as an independent and objective official responsible for
conducting, supervising, monitoring and initiating audits,
investigations and inspections relating to programs and
operations of the DOD. In 1986, the Packard Commission
recommended the USDA oversee establishment of contract audit
policy throughout the DOD [Ref. l:p. 92]. However, the DODIG
has retained overall responsibility for all audit policy for
the DOD. DODIG is also responsible for overseeing and
reporting the DCAA's implementation of policy. [Ref. 20]
The DCAA is responsible for performing all contract
audits for the DOD. It also provides contract audit services
to other government agencies, as appropriate. In connection
with negotiation, administration, and settlement of contracts,
the DCAA provides accounting and advisory services regarding
contracts and subcontracts to all DOD components responsible
for procurement and contract administration. Advisory
services include reviewing the efficiency and economy of
contract operations and evaluating the costs claimed or
18
proposed by contractors. The DCAA is under the direction,
authority and control of the DOD Co-ptroller. [Ref. 20]
All of the military services' plant representative and
contract administration offices have been brought under the
control of the Deferse Contract Management Command (DCMC),
which is a component of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).
The purpose is to streamline DOD contract management by
consolidating and standardizing contract administration
services. Worldwide engineering and program support,
contractor and quality assurance, and contract management
support will no longer be managed by different Military
Departments and DLA, but wili be standardized under DCMC.
[Ref. 20]
A simplified organizational chart of key government
organizations in the contractor audit process is provided in
Figure 1.
3. The Contractor's Organization
Figure 2 is a simplified organizational chart of the
General Dynamics Corporation. Its various divisions and
subsidiaries produce a diver3e group of products and services
requiring different accounting procedures whicb make it
difficult to compare CRAG Program benefits and costs. To
provide a common frame of reference, this study will focus on
four closely related General Dynamics divisions located in San






















Figure 1. Key Government Organizations in
the Contractor Audit Process
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Figure 2. Simplified Organizational Chart
for General Dynamics Corporation
Source: FEDERAL Orqanization Service, Industry, 1990.
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4. Government and Contractor Responsibilities
The primary purpose of the CRAG Program is to improve
contractor internal control systems through self-governance.
The government also expects to save money by reducing the
number and scope of audits required. Fewer audits mean
contractors can assign their employees to more productive
work. Ultimately, improved internal control systems result in
increased effectiveness and an improved image to the public.
The degree to which the government can reduce oversight for a
particular CRAG Program area will be determined by the degree
to which the government can rely on the contractor's internal
controls. Access to and documentation of contractor internal
audits is essential to enable government representatives to
responsibly and properly evaluate the contractor's procedures
and their application.
To facilitate the exchange of information, the ACO will:
(Ref. 3:p. 16]
- arrange for the contractor to meet the appropriate DOD
oversight officials,
- advise off-site DOD oversight activities of the existence
and status of the CRAG Program,
- help identify and prevent duplicative and overlapping
oversight, and
- work with the appropriate oversight official to ensure
that oversight levels are commensurate with the quality
and reliability of a contractor's internal control
systems.
The appropriate DOD oversight official will:
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establish with the contractor a coordination process for
ensuring that the DOD is fully aware of the contractor's
plans and accomplishments,
integrate the effect of the contractor's efforts into
planned oversight activities, and
inform the contractor and the ACO, through periodic
meetings, of the extent to which contractor activities
have influenced the scope of DOD oversight.
Contractors participating in the CRAG Program will:
notify the ACO of the risk areas in which the contractor
plans to participate in the CRAG Program,
describe and document the policies, procedures, and
controls that define the system addressing the contractor
risk area(s),
where appropriate, describe and document the contractor's
program for training employees in CRAG Program procedures
and policies,
describe and document the mechanism(s) utilized to
monitor and test the system,
demonstrate, in a manner mutually agreed to by the ACO
and by the cognizant DOD oversight activity, that the
system is functioning as described, and
maintain continuing surveillance over the internal
control system to assure that the CRAG objectives are
being met.
B. AUDIT STANDARDS
The government generally recognizes standards set forth by
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and
incorporates them into the Generally Accepted Government
Auditing Standards (GAGAS). The Comptroller General of the
United States has pointed out [Ref 21:p. 1-4] that the audit
standards are more than a codification of current practices.
They represent guidelines for a vital and constantly changing
23
process. In order to meet the audit demands of a wide variety
of programs and services, government auditors must rely on a
set of basic premises. In addition, government auditors'
interpretation of the CRAG Program policies will be shaped by
these premises.
1. Basic Premises for Government Auditors
Government auditing standards are based upon and
developed on the following premises: [Ref. 21:p. 1-4]
a. Definition of Audit
An audit may refer to either a financial or a
performance audit. Financial audits are generally divided
into financial statement and financial related audits.
Performance audits are generally divided into economy and
efficiency and program audits. In addition to more specific
functions, each of these audits determine if those being
audited have complied with applicable laws and regulations.
Financial statement audits are used to determine whether
or not an audited entity's financial statements present the
results of operations, cash flows, financial position or
change in financial position fairly and in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles.
Financial related audits determine if other financial
reports and items such as accounts or funds have been
presented fairly. They also determine if financial
information has been reported in accordance with established
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or specified criteria and if any specific compliance
requirements have been violated.
Economy and efficiency audits are used to indicate if
resources are being acquired, protected, and used in an
economic and efficient manner. If not, the audit will
identify the causes. They are sometimes referred to as
functional audits.
Program audits determine to what extent the desired or
targeted goals or benefits of a program have been achieved.
They also assess the effectiveness of the organizations,
programs, activities, or functions involved.
b. Public Official Responsibility
Every public official is responsible for the
efficient, economic, and effective application of resources
for which they have been entrusted. They shall also ensure
those resources are used for the purpose for which they were
intended.
c. Public Official Accountability
Public officials are accountable to both the
government and the public.
d. Internal Control Syatem
An effective internal control system will be
established to ensure reliable data are obtained, laws and
regulations are observed, resources are safeguarded, and goals
and objectives are met.
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*. Laws and Regulations
It is the responsibility of every public official
to know and comply with all applicable laws and regulations.
f. Availability of Audit Reports
Audit reports should be made available to the
public and to other levels of government which provided
resources unless legally prohibited or ethically improper.
g. Cooperation within the Government
Government agencies with auditing programs of
common interest should cooperate to prevent duplication of
audit effort.
h. Reliance on the Work of Others
Auditors may rely on the work of others if those
performing the work have demonstrated independence,
capability, and acceptable performance by appropriate tests or
other acceptable methods.
2. Internal Audit Standards
Standards form a set of criteria against which an
audit function can be evaluated [Ref. 22:p. 14]. The standards
were developed by the Institute of Internal Auditors.
Although other organizations such as the U.S. GAO have
previously developed such standards, the Institute of Internal
Auditors' effort represents the first time internal audit
standards have been developed to serve all levels of both
business and government [Ref. 23:p. 2]. These standards
represent a common language between industry and government
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which is critical to the success of the CRAG Program. The
standards have been divided into five chapters as described
below. (Refs. 22:pp. 21-22, 23:p. 2]
a. Independence
Internal auditors are expected to be independent
of the activities they audit and perform audits in an
objective manner. The auditing organization should be
sufficient to independently carry out its responsibilities.
b. Professional Proficiency
Internal Audits should be performed with
proficiency and due professional care. The internal auditing
department will ensure that internal auditors have the
educational background and technical proficiency necessary to
perform the assigned audits. The department shall possess or
obtain the knowledge, skills, and disciplines required to
perform its audit responsibilities. Auditors will maintain
their technical competence through continuing education. They
will be skilled in dealing with people and in communicating
effectively. Supervision of internal audits shall be provided
by the internal audit department.
c. Scope of Work
The internal audit should include an assessment of
an organization's internal control systems and the quality of
performance of those systems.
The means used to identify, measure, classify, and
report financial and operating information and the reliability
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and integrity of that information shall be reviewed by the
internal auditor. It is the internal auditor's responsibility
to review the systems established to ensure compliance with
policies, plans, procedures, laws, and regulations which could
have a material impact on operations and reports. The
internal auditor is also expected to verify the existence of
all assets, review the means used to safeguard those assets,
and appraise the efficiency and economy with which resources
are employed.
Finally, the internal auditor will review
operations or programs to determine if results are consistent
with stated objectives and goals and whether the operations or
programs are being performed as planned.
d. Performance of Audit Work
Audit work begins with planning, is followed by
the actual audit and evaluation, then communication of the
results, and finally a follow-up is conducted.
A plan should be prepared for every audit.
Internal auditors are expected to collect, analyze, interpret,
and document information to support the results of each audit.
Follow-up action should be taken by the internal auditor to
determine if appropriate action has been taken on reported
audit findings.
.. Management of the Internal Auditing Department
The director of the internal auditing department
is responsible for the proper management of the department.
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A statement of purpose, authority, and
responsibility for the internal auditing department will be
prepared by the director of the department. He should
establish plans and provide written policies and procedures to
guide the audit staff and establish a program for selecting
and developing the human resources of the internal auditing
department. The director of internal auditing coordinates
internal and external audit efforts; he also establishes and
maintains a quality assurance program to evaluate internal
auditing department operations.
3. When the Government Relies on the Work of Others
The Government Auditing Standards contain specific
instructions for reliance upon the work of others. This
guidance was primarily intended for cooperation between
federal, state, and local governments [Ref 21:p. 3-14]. Since
the Packard Commission Report, there has been increased
emphasis on cooperation between agencies within the same level
of government. The CRAG Program seeks to improve industry's
internal audit capability and the degree to which the
government can rely on that capability.
a. Relying on External Auditors
To avoid duplication of effort, a government
auditor may want to rely on work already completed by other
auditors. For example, the certified public accounting firm
of Arthur Andersen & Company has been retained by General
Dynamics as an external auditor. Before relying on the
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findings of a private firm such as Arthur Andersen & Company,
government auditor should: [Ref. 21:p. 3-14]
- make inquiries into the professional reputation,
qualifications, and independence of the auditors,
- consider whether to conduct additional tests and
procedures such as reviewing the audit procedures
followed and results of the audit conducted by other
auditors,
- consider whether to review the audit programs of other
auditors, and
- consider whether to review the working papers, including
their understanding and assessment of internal controls,
tests of compliance, and the conclusions reached by other
auditors.
b. Relying on Internal Auditors
When a government auditor wants to rely on the
work of internal auditors such as General Dynamics' own
corporate auditors, tests should include: [Ref. 21:p. 3-15]
- determining whether they are qualified,
- determining whether they are properly located in the
organization in order to provide them with sufficient
independence to conduct the audit objectively,
- determining whether their work is acceptable by
examining, on a test basis, the documentary evidence of
the work conducted,
- conducting tests of the work such as actual or similar
transactions, balances, or work the internal auditor
examined.
C. CRAG CHAPTERS
The DOD Contractor Risk Assessment Guide is divided into
five areas representing a high risk of contractor error,
fraud, waste, and abuse. Each of these areas is called a
chapter. As the program expands, other chapters are expected
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to be added. Each chapter provides broad guidelines and
objectives for that area of the contractor's internal control
system. The chapters are not intended to dictate particular
procedures or controls which must be used; rather, they
explain what an internal control system must accomplish to
enable government auditors to rely on the contractor's self-
governance efforts. [Ref. 24:p. iii]
1. Indirect Cost Submissions
The primary control objective of indirect cost
submissions is to provide assurance that U.S. laws and
regulations are being adhered to in the preparation and
submission of indirect cost claims, proposals, and billings
applicable to U.S. government contracts. [Ref. 24:p. 1]
Policies and procedures to allocate allowable costs
in billings, claims, and proposals applicable to U.S.
government contracts should be established and maintained as
stated in FAR 31.2 and Cost Accounting Standards (CAS).
Indirect costs and directly associated costs should be
properly classified as allowable or unallowable as identified
in FAR 31.205, for U.S. government contract costing, billing,
and pricing purposes. Indirect costs should be properly
allocated to cost objectives in accordance with the FAR and
CAS. Reasonable evidence should be provided to indicate tha
policies and procedures are currently in practice, understood,
and effectively implemented by contractor employees.
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2. Labor Charging
The primary control objective of labor charging is
to establish timekeeping and labor charging practicep which
result in accurate apsignment of allowable and allocable labor
costs to U.S. government contracts. [Ref. 2 4:p. 2]
Written policies and procedures should be provided
to instruct employees on the proper charging of direct and
indirect labor, and to ensure time charged to cost objectives
is recorded accurately. A system of internal controls should
include: [Ref. 2 4 :p. 2]
- the maintenance of accurate labor cost data,
- the accumulation and recording of labor costs allocable
to cost objectives for the purpose of determining proper
cost reimbursement on government contracts,
- the verification of labor cost transfers, and
- the segregation of responsibilities for labcr related
activities.
All employees should receive appropriate training on proper
labor charging practices. Timekeeping records should be
documented, including authorizations and approvals, to ensure
labor hours are being accurately recorded. A system should be
in place to verify that labor costs are being properly
allocated to cost objectives, and to document and approve
labor transfers or adjustments of the labor distribution.
Overall integrity of the labor/timekeeping system must be
monitored.
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3. Material Management and Accounting Systems
The primary c-ntrol objective of material management
and accounting systems is to provide internal accountiiv and
administrative controls which will provide assurance of system
and data integrity. [Ref. 24:p. 3]
A system description of material management and
accounting systems should exist which includes policies,
procedures and operating instructions in compliance with the
FAR and CAS. A bill of materials and master production
schedule should be established to verify that costs of
purchased and fabricated material charqed or allocated to a
contract are based on valid time-phased requirements. A bill
of material accuracy of 98 percent and production schedule
accurac- of 95 percent are desirable. A mechanism must be
provided to identify, report, and resoJve system control
weaknesses and manual overrides. Audit trails and records
must be maintained which enable evaluation of system logic and
verification through transaction testing that the system is
operating a7 desired. The material management and accounting
system should also establish and maintain an adequate level of
physical inventory accuracy. A goal of 95 percent accuracy is
desirable.
Manual or system generated transfers of parts must
be described in detail. Contractors are required to maintain
and disclose a written policy describing tiansfer
methodologies. Costing of material transactions should reveal
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a consistent, equitable, and unbiased logic. The system
should transfer parts and associated cost within the same
billing period. If that is not practical, a loan/payback
technique must be approved by the ACO.
The material management and accounting system must
provide controls to ensure that physically commingled
inventories, which may include materials charged or allocated
to fixed price, cost type, and commercial contracts, do not
compromise requirements of the previously mentioned controls.
Periodic internal audits to ensure compliance with established
policies and procedures must be performed.
4. Estimating Systems
The primary objective of estimating systems is to
provide cost estimates that are current, accurate and complete
through the use of appropriate source date, sound estimating
techniques, appropriate judgement, maintenance of a consistent
approach, and adherence to FAR 15-811, other Federal
regulations, and existing company policies and procedures.
[Ref. 24:p. 6]
A complete description of the organization, along
with duties and responsibilities of personnel who prepare,
review, and approve cost estimates, will be provided in
writing. Accounting, planning and other functions which
contribute to the estimating process will also be provided in
writing.
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Written guidelines will be developed to ensure
estimating source data are applied appropriately which support
consistent and verifiable proposals. Compliance reviews will
be conducted to ensure estimating system policies and
procedures have been implemented, remain current, and are
routinely reviewed.
5. Purchasing
The primary control objective of purchasing is to
ensure adequate purchasing methods are L > ! for the
acquisition of supplies and services under the terms of
contracts with the Department of Defense. [Ref 24:p. 7]
To develop an adequate purchasing system, policies
and procedures should be written to guide employees in the
efficient and cost-effective implementation of purchasing
practices. An adequate system of internal controls should be
developed and implemented. Subcontracts should contain all
applicable flow down clauses as required by the prime contract
and any additional clauses necessary to perform the
requirements of the prime contract.
Effective management is also necessary to ensure
appropriate make-or-buy decisions are made, parts and
materials are procured from the most responsible/reliable
sources at the most economical price, and contractor quality
requirements are met. Cost-effective and efficient purchase
requirements must be developed and some form of price or cost
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analysis must be performed with every purchase action. The
overall integrity of the purchasing system must be monitored.
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IV. EFFECTS OF CRAG PROGRAM PARTICIPATION
A. GENERAL
The primary General Dynamics units in San Diego,
California, influenced by CRAG Program implementation include
Convair Division, Electronics Division, Space Systems
Division, Western Data Center, and the Financial Services
Center.
The Convair Division produces three major product lines:
the Tomahawk Cruise Missile, Advanced Cruise Missile, and the
fuselage for the McDonald Douglas MD-II aircraft. Electronics
Division provides support for Convair and Space Systems
Divisions on the Cruise Missile and Atlas Centaur Programs.
The Electronics Division also produces automatic test
equipment and items in support of the F-16 aircraft. Space
Systems Division produces the Atlas Missile, performs work on
the Titan Centaur, produces launch vehicles for General
Dynamics' commercial Launch Services subsidiary, and performs
research and development efforts on various space, energy, and
advanced programs. The Western Data Center provides data
processing services to General Dynamics' San Diego divisions,
Pomona, and the Valley Systems Division. The Financial
Services Center prepares payrolls, processes travel vouchers,
and performs accounts payable services for all west coast and
various other General Dynamics divisions.
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The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) is the government
organization most significantly impacted by the CRAG Program
implementation at General Dynamics' San Diego divisions. The
DCAA began its involvement with the CRAG Program at General
Dynamics San Diego in April 1989. They held meetings with
Convair, Space Systems, Western Data Center, and Electronics
divisions to discuss their planned implementation of the five
CRAG areas: indirect costs, labor, material management and
accounting systems (MMAS), estimating, and purchasing. Since
then, DCAA and General Dynamics' San Diego divisions have
worked together and made progress in all five CRAG areas.
General Dynamics has routinely presented workpaper packages to
DCAA which outline the internal controls in place in various
CRAG areas. They chose this approach because it describes and
documents the policies, procedures and controls which define
the system and addresses the CRAG risk area(s).
One major part of DCAA's involvement in the CRAG Program
has been coordination with General Dynamics to help them
recognize risk areas identified in previously completed DCAA
audit reviews and vulnerability assessments. The DCAA has
also provided annual audit program plans to ensure that those
areas of risk identified receive sufficient coverage. The
DCAA's preliminary reviews indicated that the quality of
General Dynamics' documentation packages were not consistent.
Since this would impact on the DCAA's ability to rely on the
documentation, regular meetings were held with internal
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auditors and General Dynamics division representatives to
ensure that a clear picture of internal audit controls was
being presented by the documentation. The involvement of
General Dynamics' Vice President in charge of internal
auditing and their western region internal audit manager was
instrumental in ensuring development of a consistent
documentation and presentation approach.
General Dynamics divisions in San Diego quickly discovered
that documenting and testing systems covered by the CRAG areas
could be a difficult assignment. For instance, General
Dynamics' corporate office mandated that every San Diego
division would have all five CRAG areas documented by 31
December 1989. The deadline was rescheduled for 31 December
1990. The DCAA estimates that if General Dynamics' San Diego
contractors utilize their internal audit staff to develop
documentation standards for system descriptions and provide
training for the subsequent testing, the 1990 time line might
still be achievable for some of the areas. But, despite
significant progress, the DCAA contends that realistically,
they expect the contractor's efforts on the initial
documentation to continue through Fiscal Year (FY) 1991.
General Dynamics' commitment to the CRAG Program and self-
governance has carried over into areas which have a direct
impact on decreased oversight and related audit hour
reductions. The two most significant areas have been
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coordinated statistical sampling and coordination of General
Dynamics and government audits.
B. COORDINATED STATISTICAL SAMPLING
In 1988 General Dynamics and DCAA agreed upon sampling
plans to be used for annual indirect cost submissions. The
samples are used primarily to evaluate the effectiveness of
existing internal controls for the identification and
segregation of unallowable costs. General Dynamics' San Diego
divisions use a stratified statistical sampling approach.
This approach is frequently used if there are significant
dollar differences between the various costs being reviewed.
Indirect cost claims are divided into different categories
such as high, medium, and low value. Then samples are drawn
based upon the value of claims such as 100 percent of the high
value, 40 percent of the medium value, and 10 percent of the
low value claims.
A review of the 1985 and 1986 Convair and Electronics
Division -i-jit results indicated to DCAA that the divisions'
internal controls had been improved and statistical sampling
error rates were decreasing. As a result, DCAA reduced
budgeted audit hours for the 1987 claims from 750 to 600 in
each division for a total saving of 300 hours. [Ref. 25: p. 2]
Space Systems Division was formed in 1987. Based on
experience gained from Convair and Electronics Divisions, and
considering DCAA's full participation in the 1987 statistical
sample at the Space Systems Division, the DCAA resident
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auditor decided to decrease his programmed budget from 1450 to
850 hours or a 600-hour reduction. (Ref. 25:p. 2]
The 1987 audits revealed that the San Diego divisions were
using the corporate internal audit staff to review their work
prior to certification. As a result, DCAA and the internal
audit staff were reviewing much of the same work. Since the
government's auditors already had knowledge of the quality of
the internal audit groups work, they decided to use the
internal audit's work on the 1988 claim.
The DCAA San Diego office is also working with the
corporate internal audit staff and the divisions to get them
to perform all of the Mandatory Annual Audit Requirements
(MAARs) reconciliations in order to reduce DCAA's audit effort
to testing General Dynamics' internal audit review. Based on
the anticipated cooperation, DCAA San Diego expects to save up
to 2200 audit hours in FY 1991. While performing audits of
General Dynamics' FY 1989 and 1990 overhead claims at the four
major divisions, DCAA expects to save the hours by using the
corporate internal auditor's work on the overhead claims and
by getting General Dynamics' corporate auditors to perform
some of the MAARs.
C. AUDIT COORDINATION
1. Electronic Data Processing General Controls
Additional audit resource savings were obtained when
DCAA conducted preaudit planning and coordination with General
Dynamics' internal audit staff on their functional reviews.
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The DCAA performs both functional and program reviews. A
functional review checks to see if the contractor is
performing in an efficient manner. A program review is
intended to determine if the contractor is performing in an
effective manner; he is accomplishing the originally intended
purpose.
The FY 1990 requirements plan provides an illustration
of how audit hours were saved. The DCAA had identified a
general controls review as a required audit in FY 1990. The
general controls review was budgeted in the DCAA requirements
plan at 900 hours to provide adequate coverage for an
anticipated electronic data processing program (Ref. 25:p. 3].
Prior to establishing the final hours to be programmed, DCAA
representatives held a meeting with General Dynamics' internal
audit staff to discuss their planned audits and General
Dynamics' planned internal audits for their fiscal year 1990.
General Dynamics fiscal year runs from 1 January through 31
December.
General Dynamics' Staff Vice President for Internal
Audit attended the meeting and agreed to consider a joint
audit with DCAA auditors. The primary reasoning was that DCAA
had a requirement to perform this review prior to the March
1990 start of the proposed electronic data processing pilot
program. The knowledge gained from this audit about the
adequacy of the general controls could be used to determine
DCAA's requirements for their electronic data processing
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application program reviews. Since General Dynamics was
already scheduled to perform this audit as part of the 1989
financial review, it made sense to see if the audit could be
done concurrently.
DCAA's Southwestern Region Headquarters coordinated
the audits, primarily to ensure that the general control
review scope met the requirements of the electronic data
processing pilot program. General Dynamics and DCAA auditors
agreed to conduct a coordinated audit or joint review which
was expected to result in reduced audit hours for both
parties. The program plan was developed and DCAA reduced
their required hours from 900 to 600 [Ref. 25:p. 3]. Audit
programs were exchanged to ensure the audit scope would
satisfy the needs of each of the parties. The DCAA's review
revealed that the General Dynamics audit program was
acceptable.
General Dynamics and DCAA auditors agreed to review
selected areas and then each party would review the work of
the other to determine the extent of reliance to be placed on
the work. General Dynamics was informed that the DCAA planned
to issue an audit report to the administrative contracting
officer (ACO) and decided to use the DCAA report rather than
prepare a duplicate report of their own. The coordination
resulted in an expected 100 audit hour reduction. The budget
was reduced from 600 to 500 hours. Altogether, the DCAA
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expected the joint review to save approximately 400 hours from
the original 900-hour budget. [Ref. 25:p. 3]
The audit which was completed in March 1990 took
approximately 800 hours or 300 hours over DCAA's final budget.
The DCAA attributed the budget overrun to their decision
during the review to expand the review to cover General
Dynamics' Pomona data centers. General Dynamics Pomona had
also been scheduled to conduct a general control review, which
was now no longer required, so the joint review actually saved
approximately 380 hours: 100 hours for San Diego (900 minus
800) and 280 hours for Pomona. [Ref. 25:p. 4]
The DCAA resident office in San Diego was quick to
point out that they had underestimated the hours they thought
it would require to complete the audit. They attributed the
error to the fact that this was their first joint review and
had not realized how long it would take to come to an
understanding of definitions and procedures.
On the positive side, the DCAA also pointed out that
the audit report was received by General Dynamics in a
nonconfrontational manner and the contractor was fully
responsive to their recommendations. They attributed this to
the support provided by General Dynamics' corporate office.
The interface between the auditors also provided excellent
training as a fringe benefit. The DCAA staff in San Diego
reported that General Dynamics has some very talented
electronic data processing auditors and they were very
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impressed at the quality of their work [Ref. 25:p. 4]. The
cooperation provided hands-on experience which can be expected
to improve the quality and uniformity of future joint reviews.
2. Financial Services Center
The internal audit program plan coordination meeting
held between General Dynamics and the DCAA also identified a
planned audit of the newly established Financial Services
Center as another possible target for reduced audit scope.
In 1988 General Dynamics established a separate
division which it hoped would save money by consolidating
accounts payable, payroll, and travel claims processing which
were being prepared separately by Convair, Space Systems,
Electronics, Western Data Center, Pomona, and Valley Systems
Divisions.
There was no substantive knowledge of how effective
the internal controls were at the new General Dynamics
Financial Services Center. The DCAA's only knowledge was that
problems had been encountered as the various divisions shifted
the affected financial services to the Financial Services
Center.
The government was informed at the internal audit
program plan coordination meeting that General Dynamics'
auditors were currently performing an internal audit of the
Financial Services Center operations. The areas which DCAA
perceived as audit risk were discussed and a decision was made
to determine if the General Dynamics internal audit provided
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adequate coverage to address DCAA's concerns. DCAA also
offered to furnish a list of their concerns pertaining to
travel claims and the DCAA audit programs for accounts payable
reviews and labor. General Dynamics was also informed that
the Defense Contract Audit Agency Manual (DCAAM) would be an
excellent source of data for evaluating the government's audit
concerns. General Dynamics agreed to review the data and
provide DCAA with a separate study comparing their audit scope
with DCAA's audit guidance to determine if any audit effort
anticipated by DCAA could be reduced or eliminated.
The DCAA's San Diego office decided to wait for the
results of General Dynamics' internal audit of the Financial
Services Center before commencing their own. As promised,
General Dynamics' internal auditors met with DCAA in November
1989 to discuss the results of their review. Government and
General Dynamics auditors examined the report, the report
findings, and a separate study which reconciled their audit
scope with DCAA's concerns. The DCAA stated the study was
very detailed, including the cross-referencing of audit steps
to the workpaper package which was also made available for
review. General Dynamics' internal auditors had performed an
adequate audit according to DCAA. The government decided to
reduce its audit scope to testing of various areas and follow-
up of identified problems. The planned budget was reduced from
600 to 200 hours. [Ref. 25 :p. 5]
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3. Material Management and Accounting Systems
The DCAA's planned follow-up reviews on Convair and
Electronics, and Space Systems MMAS reviews, prcvide another
example of coordination between the government and General
Dynamics' internal audit staff. In their FY 1991 requirements
plan, DCAA identified three follow-up reviews based upon
deficiencies identified during reviews of General Dynamics'
demonstration of compliance with the ten key MMAS elements.
The key MMAS elements are discussed in detail in the DOD
Contractor Risk Assessment Guide. During a meeting at Convair
Division, General Dynamics described the results of their MMAS
corrective action plan and informed DCAA that their internal
auditors :'ere planning to audit the divisions' actions for
compliance with DCAA's recommendations.
DCAA representatives decided to meet with the internal
auditors to discuss how the General Dynamics audit could be
used to limit DCAA's planned follow-up re-riew. The-, met and
agreed that the internal auditors would perform the follow-up
reviews at all three divisions and DCAA would review their
work. DCAA had estimated that these audits would require 300
hours each. They now expect to do the follow-ups in about 80
hours each. [Ref. 25:p. 5]
Also at the Convair Division meeting General Dynamics'
internal auditors and the DCAA auditors agreed to coordinate
all future MMAS audits. DCAA and the internal auditors could
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either perform joint reviews or divide audits of the ten key
elements to get maximum coverage with less audit resources.
4. Coordination of Requirements Plan
On 29 August 1990 the DCAA San Diego staff met with
General Dynamics' corporate internal audit staff to discuss
DCAA's requirements plan and General Dynamics' proposed
requirements plan. The DCAA staff provided the corporate
audit group with their FY 1991 requirements plan and their
audit workpackage analyses (AWAs). The corporate audit group
provided their proposed plan to the DCAA personnel.
A comparison of the two plans revealed areas of audit
overlap in labor, billing systems, and estimating. The
General Dynamics internal auditors now know where DCAA
perceives audit risk and have stated they will use this data
to determine where they can assist or even perform some of the
suggested audits. The DCAA plans to continue meeting with the
internal auditors and will modify their requirements whenever
the internal auditors participate in reviews of their
identified risk areas.
The DCAA also noted that the internal audit manager
asked for some of their AWAs so they could document risk for
their own management and tailor some of their audits to
address DCAA's concerns. 'Ref. 25:p. 6]
D. FISCAL YEAR 1991 AUDIT REQUIREMENTS PLAN
The DCAA San Diego field audit office (FAO) developed
their workload plans and estimated requirements for FY 1991
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based on contractor forecasts and operating plans. They also
relied on their knowledge of the current contracting
environment and its impact on the contractor's projected
costs. They compared current requirements to those in prior
years, utilized VAPa, MAARS control logs, cost accounting
standards (CAS) compliance control schedules, internal control
questionnaires (ICQ), audit leads, and AWAs. (Ref. 26:p. 2]
The San Diego DCAA resident auditor has noted that staff
requirements have dropped from 34 in 1990 to 27 in 1991,
partially due to the CRAG Program. [Ref. 27]
The San Diego FAO has reported a 7.1 percent productivity
improvement in their FY 1991 requirements plan. That
represents a reduction of 3740 audit hours. The CRAG Program
is responsible for 3130 of those hours identified in Table II.
[Ref. 26:p. 4]
E. SUM ARY
The dramatic results exhibited in Table II reflect initial
audit hour savings in only two of the five CRAG Program areas.
Coordinated audit efforts of the Material Management and
Accounting Systems appear to be achieving similar results.
CRAG Program implementation of Estimating Systems and
Purchasing are still in progress, but the atmosphere of
cooperation is having an impact. For example, a follow-up
review of Space Systems' purchasing system is expected to take
less than half of the originally scheduled hours as a result
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of cooperation between government and General Dynamics
personnel. [Refs. 28, 29]
TABLE II.
CRAG PROGRAM FY 1991 AUDIT HOUR SAVINGS
AUDIT HOUR REDUCTIONS BY DIVISION
SPACE WESTERN
AUDIT AREA CONVAIR ELECTRONICS SYSTEMS DATA CENTER
LABOR
CHARGING 400 200 150 320
INDIRECT
COST
SUBMISSIONS 410 590 1120 90
TOTALS 810 790 1270 410
TOTAL LABOR CHARGING AUDIT HOURS SAVED: 1070
TOTAL INDIRECT COST SUBMISSION AUDIT HOURS SAVED: 2210
TOTAL AUDIT HOURS SAVED: 3130
Source: General Dynamics Corporation, San Diego
Resident Office Narrative for the FY 1991
Requirements Plan, 18 July 1990
The potential benefits of the CRAG Program are just
beginning to be realized. The relationship between the
government and General Dynamics in San Diego has changed from
adversarial to cooperative. As an example, internal auditors
for General Dynamics in San Diego recently provided the DCAA
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with evidence of an accounting error for which the government
was entitled a refund. (Ref. 29]
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V. ANALYSIS
A. GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY RELATIONS
1. General
The primary benefit of the CRAG Program identified by
this research is the enhanced communication and cooperation
which has resulted from an improved relationship between
General Dynamics Corporation and the government. The CRAG
Program has served as an effective tool for improving the
government and industry relationship. Since it is difficult
to measure or to quantify the value of a good relationship
between government and industry, this section will focus on
the problems which result from poor relations. An exaggerated
adversarial relationship creates an environment in which
meaningful improvements become more difficult [Ref. 29:p. 40].
In May 1990, a senior defense industry executive described the
environment between government and industry as follows:
I have never seen the defense industry the way it is
right now. Morale is low, companies are losing hundreds
of millions of dollars and there is widespread anxiety
about the Defense budget. We are thrust together in a
relationship that requires contractors, the Defense
Department and Congress to work together. But instead, we
operate in an environment of suspicion, fear, and even
some danger. [Ref. 30:p. 134]
Another senior defense industry executive described the result
of ten years of procurement reform as:
... thousands of pages of new rules and regulations,
and thousands of auditors, investigators and quality
inspectors and support staff...some 22,000 all together,
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and a near doubling of the Defense Contract Audit Agency
... which has produced a climate of confusion, and often an
alleged criminalization of that confusion. [Ref. 31:p. 4]
Over half of the top 100 U.S. defense contractors were under
investigation for some form of fraud, waste, or abuse in 1988
[Ref. 32:p. 44]. Despite this difficult environment, General
Dynamics Corporation is experiencing good relations with the
government. Through the CRAG Program, the government and
General Dynamics have increased communication with frequent
meetings, coordinated their audit planning, and General
Dynamics' auditors have independently identified and offered
to return incorrect payments (Ref. 27]
2. Impact of Adversarial Relations
Businesses in a free market environment are usually
able to withstand an adversarial relationship. Competition
usually forces sellers to operate efficiently, offer
reasonable prices, and maintain an acceptable level of
quality. However, the government and the defense industry
often do not operate in a free market environment. A study
conducted by the Defense Science Board in 1986 concluded that
the acquisition processes used by commercial businesses would
not always be effective for use by the government [Ref. 33 :p.
23]. The greatest dollar value of defense contracts is
allocated to large, expensive systems. In those situations
there are only a few sellers. The elimination of any of those
suppliers could reduce competition, extend delivery periods
and impact military readiness. In 1987 over half of defense
53
procurement dollars were spent on one percent of defense
contracts [Ref. 34:p. 26].
Since the government is the only buyer of many defense
industry products, defense contractors may also be harmed by
adversarial relations. During the past decade, many major
defense contractors found that if they wanted government
business, they were required to accept fixed price research
and development contracts. It can be argued that these
contracts represented an adversarial effort by the government
to shift an excessive portion of risk to defense contractors.
Such past adversarial policies have extracted a heavy toll
from many defense contractors. Seven of the top ten defense
contractors have reported heavy losses as a result of fixed
price research and development contracts [Ref. 35]. In July
1990, every major American defense contractor, except Boeing,
was experiencing an excessive debt ratio [Ref. 36]. As a
result of this adversarial environment, companies are less
willing to invest in research and productive facilities. Many
are divesting themselves of defense contracts altogether,
while others are simply going out of business. The
consequences are fewer sources of defense products, reduced
technological advancement, and increased dependency on foreign
suppliers.
An exaggerated adversarial relationship contributes to
the public's perception that the defense industry is comprised
of "amoral contractors, squeezing profits from sales of
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second-rate products." [Ref. 3 0:p. 134] This perception
creatas additional, and perhaps misplaced, pressure to reduce
defense spending. The public has the right to demand that tax
dollars be spent effectively, but distorted perceptions,
created by an exaggerated adversarial relationship, may lead
to incorrect public choices which could severely limit the
nation's ability to defend its interests.
3. Government and Contractor Concerns
Some government officials are concerned that the CRAG
Program may provide a method for contractors to avoid valid
defective pricing charges. For example, a government
inspector may be required to provide audit plans which could
undermine a five-year-long defective pricing investigation.
CRAG Program detractors from the defense industry perceive it
from a different perspective. They are concerned that over-
zealous government auditors may use additional access to
company records to increase and target government oversight.
They argue that rather than improving contractor self-
governance, the CRAG Program could exacerbate disputes between
government representatives and contractors and actually lead
to increased oversight [Ref. 37:p. 3]. There has been no
definitive evidence to support either concern. As of late
July 1990, none of the five largest companies participating in
the CRAG Program had experienced increased oversight or
suffered strained relations with government auditors as a
result of CRAG Program participation. [Ref. 38]
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Although a little skepticism is usually considered
healthy, decreased CRAG Program participation may be one
negative side effect of government and industry concern. The
Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
acknowledged in July 1990 that support for the CRAG Program is
far from unanimous. "There are a lot of blockers who are not
too enthused about this CRAG Program, both in DCAA and in
industry." (Ref. 39]
Sometimes there is good reason for concern when
government auditors and defense contractors work closely.
George Spanton, a former DCAA manager of operations in
Florida, complained:
...of pressure from above to "get along." He blamed
the situation on the "revolving door," the many documented
cases where an auditor or a contracting officer moved into
a lucrative job with a contractor, typically upon retiring
from government service, after consistently favoring the
company soon to be his or her employer. [Ref. 32 :p. 46]
There is no evidence of such collusion at General Dynamics in
San Diego. The researcher conducted interviews from June
through November 1990 with various government and General
Dynamics auditors. Each expressed respect for the other, but
each also voiced what this researcher would call a healthy
skepticism of the other.
There is often a fine line between cooperation and
collusion. Since contractors can offer benefits or extract
costs from government auditors, they are vulnerable to the
contractor's control or "capture." The performance of
government auditors may be affected by a number of factors.
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For example, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported the
following concerning the National Grain Inspection System:
While on site, the resident inspector will probably
become acquainted with many, if not a majority, of the
plant employees on a first-name basis. The longer that
the resident inspector remains at the plant, the more he
may consider himself a part of the plant's organizational
structure. He may even begin to defend the plant against
outsiders who raise questions about plant activities. The
resident inspector may tend to regard such questions as a
reflection on his performance and professional judgement.
[Ref. 40:p. 5]
Although illegal, there is still the possibility that those
being audited may offer tangible rewards. For example,
something as innocent sounding as a Thanksgiving turkey or a
bottle of Scotch at Christmas might be offered. Finally,
contractors also have the ability to penalize government
auditors. They may be uncooperative, complain to the
auditor's superiors, and generally make the auditor's job
miserable [Ref. 41:pp. 48-58]. The unavoidable conclusion is
that even though increased cooperation is desirable, and
possibly even mandatory in this time of budget constraints,
there are increased risks which are inextricably tied to this
new relationship.
B. MONETARY VALUE OF THE CRAG PROGRAM
Defense audits usually identify between $12 billion and
$14 billion in potentially recoverable contractor charges each
year. After negotiations and litigation, the government
typically recovers between $7 billion and $9 billion. Audit
and investigation costs average roughly $1 billion. From the
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government's perspective, defense audit programs are clearly
worth the investment. [Ref. 42]
The primary objective of the CRAG Program is to improve
contractor internal control systems. As internal control
systems improve, the government will register savings in
oversight expenses. Anticipated fiscal year 1990 audit hour
savings by the DCAA at General Dynamics in San Diego were
identified in Chapter IV. Other examples include 5,400
defective pricing audit hours saved at McDonnell Aircraft
Company and over 2,700 overall audit hours saved at Martin
Marietta Astronautics Group (Ref. 43]. These reduced hours
benefit the government, but coordinated and cooperative audit
efforts often reduce the contractor's audit requirements as
well. More significant, but not directly identifiable,
savings may occur as a result of contractors' improved
internal control systems. These are the benefits accrued from
reduced waste, fraud, abuse, and from increased effectiveness.
Perhaps the most significant and immediate benefit to
participating contractors comes in the form of early contract
close-out. In recent years DCAA auditors have been
overwhelmed by the volume of work assigned. For example, a
DCAA audit staff of 34 was called for at General Dynamics' San
Diego divisions in FY 1990. Staff requirements are determined
by a standard formula which is based on dollar volume, the
number of contracts handled, and the number of mandatory
annual audit requirements (MAARs). Due to budgetary
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constraints a staff of 26 was assigned. The staff was forced
to concentrate on areas of greatest risk to the government.
Some audits which were preventing contract close-outs had to
be postponed. Self-governance initiatives such as the CRAG
Program have enabled the DCAA staff to complete several years
of backlog. The resulting final payments released to General
Dynamics represent millions of dollars and a significant
monetary inducement to continue their self-governance efforts.
[Ref. 27]
C. SUMMARY
Since beginning their implementation of the CRAG Program,
General Dynamics' San Diego Divisions have experienced good
relations with the government, improved their internal control
systems, and enabled government auditors to reduce and
reassign audit efforts. It would appear the CRAG Program is
responsible for these developments, but other activities
within the corporation may have played a larger role.
In 1986, General Dynamics Corporation established four
goals to accomplish effective self-governance:
- develop and implement a strong ethics program,
- tolerate zero defects in administrative processes,
- initiate a corporate management effectiveness program
which would annually review the operational effectiveness
of corporate policy, and
- expand the charter for the internal audit staff to include
all aspects of contract compliance.
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By 1988, General Dynamics was actively seeking ways to improve
relations with the government. The CRAG Program provided an
excellent tool to accomplish their goal. General Dynamics
estimates that implementation through the demonstration phase
required, or will require, up to 13,000 man hours per
division. In total, they expect to expend 45 man-years of
effort for ten divisions. [Ref. 44]
General Dynamics has clearly committed its resources and
its policy to the concept of self-governance. In San Diego,
the CRAG Program has proven to be an effective approach.
However, the CRAG Program is not exclusively responsible for
the improved relations and reduced audit hours identified.
The commitment of General Dynamics Corporation to the ideals
of self-governance and the pro-active attitude and cooperative
spirit of the DCAA San Diego resident audit staff are equally
responsible for the achievements.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Tne Department of Defense (DOD) CRAG Program is an
effective method to promote self-governance in the defense
industry. It is of little value without the commitment of
both government and industry. The program represents a means
to attain the desired goal of improved contractor internal
control system:i.
The CRAG Program has helped reduce duplication of audit
effort, enhanced training, and improved relations between
government audit agencies and General Dynamics divisions in
San Diego. In addition to the early success enjoyed by
General Dynamics, other major defense contractors including
Martin Marietta Corporation, General Electric Company,
McDonnell Douglas Corporation, and Unisys Defense Systems have
reported similar experiences. Despite significant progress at
these and other defense companies, many contractors still do
not fully support the program. Government proponents have
been disappointed with the degree of industry support, as
reflected in the following quotes from the DCAA's Assistant
Director for Policy and Plans and the Under Secretary of the
Defense for Acquisition:
In view of such active effort, it becomes
disheartening to hear the same tired complaints that
industry raised before there were concrete successes in
the CRAG area. [F . 14]
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If we are to improve the oversight process and reduce
the burden we must be able to demonstrate clearly that the
change is both needed and will not reduce the necessary
protection of the government's interests. I am concerned
about our ability to do so when.. .voluntary programs like
CRAG and DII (Defense Industry Initiatives) are not
enthusiastically embraced by the defense industry. [Ref.
45]
Self-governance programs such as CRAG provide enormous
opportunity to enhance defense contractor performance, reduce
and improve government oversight, cultivate better
government/industry relations, and improve the public image of
defense contractors. In this era of intense public scrutiny
and budgetary constraint, a negative defense industry image
could lead to reduced funding and a dangerously diminished
defense capability.
B. RECOMMNDATIONS
Both General Dynamics and the government have gained from
an atmosphere of increased contractor self-governance in San
Diego. It is not clear that the benefits accrued from the
CRAG Program to date are greater than the invested costs.
However, it is clear that the benefits to both government and
industry will continue to grow as costs remain relatively
constant. The DOD should continue to actively support
contractor self-governance through initiatives such as CRAG,
In-Plant Quality Evaluation (IQUE), and the Responsible
Supplier Verification Program (RSVP).
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Many defense contractors are confused by the number of
self-governance programs available and the associated
requirements, benefits and costs of each. Contractors tend to
support the concept of self-governance but often resist
individual self-governance programs which they view as
additional requirements and believe will expand government
oversight. The DOD should place greater emphasis on the
concept of self-governance and promote initiatives such as
CRAG, IQUE and RSVP as self-governance techniques rather than
as independent programs.
Audit agencies are naturally inclined to identify
contractor deficiencies. They are not generally organized to
recognize and reward activities other than the normal audit
functions. As a result, audit agency personnel who spend
considerable time and energy helping contractors to improve
internal control systems may not receive proportionate
recognition for their efforts. The DOD should establish
appropriate rewards and recognition for those officials who
successfully assist contractors to improve their internal
control systems.
C. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To what extent is the CRAG Program achieving the goal of
improved DOD oversight processes and more effective contractor
internal control systems?
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At General Dynamics in San Diego, government auditors have
identified measurable improvement in each of the CRAG internal
control areas being implemented. Joint audit planning has
enabled the DCAA to more effectively allocate resources and to
settle a substantial backlog of overhead audits. Other major
defense contractors including McDonnell Douglas, Unisys
Defense Systems, Martin Marietta Corporation, General Electric
Company, and General Motors' Hughes Aircraft Company have
experienced similar success. DOD oversight processes and
contractor internal control systems have improved
significantly at those locations and in those areas where the
CRAG Program has been implemented. However, those areas
represent a very small portion of internal control systems in
the defense industry.
What are the essential features of the CRAG ProQram as it
currently exists and how has the program been implemented?
The CRAG Program is a technique to improve contractor
internal control systems and government oversight processes.
Five internal control areas of high risk have initially been
identified: labor charging, material management and
accounting systems, indirect cost submissions, estimating
systems, and purchasing. The minimum requirements for an
effective control system, in each of the five CRAG areas, were
developed by a joint team of government and industry
representatives. Program implementation is coordinated by the
administrative contracting officer (ACO). Participating
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contractors work through their ACO to develop and demonstrate
internal control systems which can be relied upon by the
government.
To what extent has the CRAG Program changed the internal
control systems of General Dynamics' San Diego divisions?
First, the internal control systems focus more on areas of
greatest concern to the government. Second, they report their
findings in a manner which is usable by government auditors.
Finally, the CRAG Program provides an excellent source of
training to the General Dynamics internal audit staff.
To what extent has the CRAG Program changed Department of
Defense oversight for General Dynamics' San Diego divisions?
Government oversight by the DCAA is scheduled to be
reduced by over seven percent in fiscal year (FY) 1991.
Reduced oversight requirements in FY 1990 were used to
liquidate a four-year backlog of overhead audits.
What benefits and costs have resulted from the CRAG
Program at General Dynamics' San Diego divisions?
The relationship between the government and General
Dynamics' divisions in San Diego has improved significantly.
Government audit agencies have been able to assign their
assets more effectively and complete audits which allow
contracts to be closed. In most cases, upon contract close-
out, General Dynamics receives a final payment. General
Dynamics estimates the cost for implementation of the five
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CRAG areas, through the demonstration phase, to be between
3,000 and 13,000 man hours per division.
Which elements of the CRAG Program at participating
General Dynamics divisions are common to all CRAG
participants?
The ACO is the primary point of contact for the initiation
and coordination of the CRAG Program. The general guidelines
provided in the CRAG manual are the same for all participants.
There are no specific ground rules which apply to all
contractors. The internal control system requirements may
vary depending on considerations such as the nature of the
business, the operational and management structure, the type
and cost of the product produced, and the geographic location
of facilities.
What inferences may be made from the experiences of
General Dynamics' San Diego divisions which could be used by
other contractors wishing to implement the CRAG Program?
The contractor's internal audit staff should be utilized
to determine the areas of key importance to the government.
The audit staff should then train division personnel to
document internal controls to ensure they may be relied upon
by the government. Establishing an effective CRAG Program
takes dedication, time, and the support of corporate
management.
What level of support has been demonstrated for the CRAG
Program by government and industry?
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The government believes fully in the CRAG Program and has
demonstrated its support repeatedly in articles, at
conferences, and through the leadership of officials including
the Under Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition, DOD
Comptroller General, DOD Inspector General, Director of the
Defense Contract Management Command, and the Director of the
Defense Contract Audit Agency. Less than 20 major defense
contractors are actively participating in the CRAG Program.
Major industry organizations such as the Council of Defense
and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA) support the CRAG
Program but have had little success enlisting the support of
smaller contractors who believe the costs of the CRAG Program
outweigh the benefits. Despite the slow start, support
continues to grow.
D. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEAFRCH
The CRAG Program in San Diego has provided significant
benefits to the government. Increased knowledge of General
Dynamics' internal control systems has helped government
auditors focus on critical areas and assign personnel more
effectively. The DCAA audit staff in San Diego has already
reduced projected audit hours by over 7 percent and budgeted
manpower requirements by over 20 percent for FY 1991. The
benefits to General Dynamics are not as clear. At the time of
this research, only two of five CRAG Chapters had been
implemented to any significant degree. General Dynamics'
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estimates of CRAG Program costs varied by up to 400 percent.
As more data becomes available, additional research in the
form of a cost/benefit analysis would be useful in determining
the overall utility of the program.
One of the early and clear benefits of the CRAG Program
has been improved communications and relations between
government and industry. This researcher has cbserved a
quality of training and communication, between government
agencies and General Dynamics in San Diego, which will greatly
reduce the probability of procurement scandals similar to
those reported in recent years. Some industry analysts
believe that negative public opinion caused by procurement
scandals will have a significantly adverse impact on defense
spending. Additional research which tracks public opinion and
major defense scandals in relation to defense funding may




ACO Administrative Contracting Officer
AIA Aerospace Industries Association
AICPA American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
AWA Audit Workpackage Analysis
BOM Bill of Materials
CAC Contract Audit Coordinator
CAS Cost Accounting Standards
CODSIA Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations
CPSR Contractor Purchasing System Review
CRAG Contractor Risk Assessment Guide
DAB Defense Acquisition Board
DAE Defense Acquisition Executive
DAGPIR Defense Advisory Panel for Government/Industry
Relations
DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCAAM Defense Contract Audit Agency Manual
DCMC Defense Contract Management Command
DFARS Department of Defense FAR Supplement
DII Defense Industry Initiatives
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DODIG Department of Defense Inspector General
DPRO Defense Plant Representative Office
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EDP Electronic Data Processing
EIA Electronic Industries Association
FAO Field Audit Office
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation
FY Fiscal Year
GAGAS Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards
GAO General Accounting Office
IAA Institute of Internal Auditors
IQUE In-Plant Quality Evaluation
MAARs Mandatory Annual Audit Requirements
MMAS Material Management and Accounting System
NCMA National Contract Management Association
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
RSVP Responsible Supplier Verification Program
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
USDA Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
VAPS Vulnerability Assessment (Procedures)
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